November 7-8, 2003
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA

Recently, with the advent of the Internet as one of the most important arenas for resource sharing between parties with diverse and selfish interests, many new and traditional dynamic pricing mechanisms have been developed, studied, and deployed. With this, computer scientists have joined economists in studying economic performance issues in auctions and related problems.

This workshop will bring together researchers from economics and computer science, and developers of auctions in the private sector in an effort to identify, discuss, and better understand the important research directions in auction theory and practice. The focus of this meeting will be on economics goals--e.g., revenue/profit maximization and efficiency--of designed mechanisms. There are three major goals of this meeting. The first is to facilitate the dissemination of recent results and techniques between the fields of economics and computer science. The second is to see how these developments are aiding practitioners and whether we are answering questions relevant to practice. The third goal is to identify key open questions for research in the area of auctions and dynamic pricing mechanisms.

The workshop will be a combination of survey talks, new results, and informal discussion. There will be no published proceedings, but we plan to have a web page for the workshop with slides, pointers to relevant papers, and so forth.

Organizing committee:
Jason Hartline, Carnegie Mellon University
Uday Rajan, Carnegie Mellon University
R. Ravi, Carnegie Mellon University

Advance Registration Is Required by Friday, October 31, 2003
Anyone planning to attend who has not yet registered (including CMU faculty and students) should contact Susan Hrishenko to register.

 

Agenda

New Location: All sessions will be held in Newell Simon Hall 3305 unless otherwise noted.
Walking Direction from the Holiday Inn to Newell Simon Hall 3305

	Friday, November 7
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Keynote Speech: OR ∩ CS ∩ ET = ? pdf Rakesh V. Vohra, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
10:00 am	Break
10:30 am	Efficiency of Large Double Auctions Jeroen Swinkels, Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis
11:15 am	Strategic Information Acquisition and Auctions ppt Kate Larson, Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University
12:00 noon	Lunch
1:30 pm	Keynote Speech: The Price of Truth Anna Karlin, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington
2:30 pm	The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Bounds for Regret in Online Posted-Price Auctions abstract, ppt Robert Kleinberg, Department of Mathematics, MIT
3:15 pm	Break
3:45 pm	Pricing and Revenue Optimization in Electronic Commerce Vijay Kumar, Amazon.com
4:30 pm - 6:00 pm	Open Problem Session
7:00 pm	Dinner Party
	Saturday, November 8
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Keynote Speech: Asymmetries and Efficiency in Auctions Vijay Krishna, Department of Economics, Penn State University
10:00 am	Clock Auctions, Proxy Auctions, and Possible Hybrids Lawrence Ausubel, Department of Economics, University of Maryland
10:45 am	Break
11:15 am	On the Relationship Between Truthfulness and Truthfulness in Expectation Aranyak Mehta, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
12:00 noon – 1:00 pm	Discussion and Wrap-Up

Poster

 

This material is based upon work supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0122581.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Science Foundation