CENTER Carnegie Mellon UniversityCarnegie Mellon Computer Science DepartmentSchool of Computer Science
Market Design Workshop
Related Activities
Outreach Roadshow

October 28 – 29, 2004
Newell-Simon Hall 1507 and 3305,
Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

See photos

This workshop will be held at Carnegie Mellon University on October 28th and 29th (Thursday and Friday), 2004. This is organized under the auspices of two different NSF-funded ITR projects at Carnegie Mellon. The first is the ALADDIN Center (, in which this is the second workshop in a PROBlem-oriented Exploration (PROBE) on the topic of Algorithms in Economics. The second is an ITR titled Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces: Game Theory, Algorithms, and Systems, with Principal Investigators Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Ming Kao, Rakesh Vohra, Mark Satterthwaite, and Avrim Blum.

The Market Design Workshop aims to bring together a mix of computer scientists, economists, operations researchers, and financial practitioners that are interested in the design of markets. The focus of the meeting is to enhance transfer of ideas across these disciplines and stimulate new directions and avenues for future research. With this aim, talks devoted to the following general topics will be featured: Issues in the computation of equilibria, Mechanism Design, Market microstructure, Preference elicitation and information acquisition in mechanisms. The workshop will be a combination of short talks on recent research trends and informal discussions. There will be no published proceedings, but we plan to have a web page for the workshop with slides, pointers to relevant papers, and so forth.

Organizers: Avrim Blum, Christine Parlour, R. Ravi and Tuomas Sandholm.

Online Registraton Form

Tentative Schedule

All sessions will be held in Newell-Simon Hall 3305 except Thursday lunch and afternoon sessions which will be held in Newell-Simon Hall 1507.

Thursday, October 28th
9:00 am Continental Breakfast

9:30 am

Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions (abstract), (paper, pdf)

10:00 am

Jason Hartline, Microsoft Research
Near-Optimal Online Auctions (abstract), (slides)

10:30 am


11:00 am Break
11:30 am

Bob Monroe, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
Billions and Billions Sourced -- Lessons Learned Building Electronic Markets (abstract), (slides)

12:00 noon Lunch
1:30 pm

Liad Blumrosen, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
On the Computational Power of Ascending Auctions (abstract)

2:00 pm Sergei Izmalkov, MIT
Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction
2:30 pm Weizhao Wang, Illinois Institute of Technology
Towards Truthful Mechanism for Demand Games (abstract)
3:00 pm Discussion
3:30 pm Break
4:00 pm Anshul Kothari, University of California, Santa Barbara
Clearing Algorithm for Multi-Item Procurement Auctions (abstract)
4:30 pm Ryan Porter, Stanford University
Simple Search Methods for Finding a Nash Equilibrium (abstract)
Friday, October 29th
9:00 am Continental Breakfast
9:30 am Rakesh Vohra, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Characterizing Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multi-dimensional Types (abstract)
10:00 am Yishay Mansour, Tel Aviv University
Competitive Algorithms for VWAP and Limit Order Trading (abstract)
10:30 am Discussion
11:00 am Break
11:30 am Tal Heppenstall, Founder of PriMuni LLC
12:00 noon Lunch
1:30 pm Sham Kakade, University of Pennsylvania
Trading in Markovian Price Models (abstract)
2:00 pm Jean-Francois Richard, University of Pittsburgh
Computation of Nash Equilibrium Bid Functions for Asymmetric Private Values First Price Auctions (abstract)
2:30 pm Discussion
3:00 pm Break
3:30 pm Kamal Jain, Georgia Institute of Technology
A polynomial time exact algorithm to compute a market equilibrium (abstract)
4:00 pm Ronald Goettler, Carnegie Mellon University
Information Acquisition in a Limit Order Market (abstract)


This workshop is sponsored by National Science Foundation (NSF) grant nos. CCR-0122581 and CCR-0121678.



This material is based upon work supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0122581.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Science Foundation