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October 28 – 29, 2004
Newell-Simon Hall 1507 and 3305,
Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
See photos
This workshop will be held at Carnegie Mellon University on October
28th and 29th (Thursday and Friday), 2004. This is organized under
the auspices of two different NSF-funded ITR projects at Carnegie
Mellon. The first is the ALADDIN Center (www.aladdin.cs.cmu.edu),
in which this is the second workshop in a PROBlem-oriented
Exploration (PROBE) on the topic of Algorithms
in Economics. The second is an ITR titled Foundations of Electronic
Marketplaces: Game Theory, Algorithms, and Systems, with Principal
Investigators Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Ming Kao, Rakesh
Vohra, Mark Satterthwaite, and Avrim Blum.
The Market Design Workshop aims to bring together a mix of computer
scientists, economists, operations researchers, and financial
practitioners that are interested in the design of markets. The
focus of the meeting is to enhance transfer of ideas across these
disciplines and stimulate new directions and avenues for future
research. With this aim, talks devoted to the following general
topics will be featured: Issues in the computation of equilibria,
Mechanism Design, Market microstructure, Preference elicitation
and information acquisition in mechanisms. The workshop will be
a combination of short talks on recent research trends and informal
discussions. There will be no published proceedings, but we plan
to have a web page for the workshop with slides, pointers to relevant
papers, and so forth.
Organizers: Avrim Blum, Christine
Parlour, R. Ravi and Tuomas Sandholm.
Online
Registraton Form
Tentative Schedule
All sessions will be held in Newell-Simon Hall 3305 except
Thursday lunch and afternoon sessions which will be held in Newell-Simon
Hall 1507.
Thursday,
October 28th |
9:00 am |
Continental Breakfast |
9:30 am |
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie
Mellon University
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences
in (Combinatorial) Auctions (abstract),
(paper,
pdf) |
10:00 am |
Jason Hartline, Microsoft
Research
Near-Optimal Online Auctions (abstract),
(slides)
|
10:30 am |
Discussion |
11:00 am |
Break |
11:30 am |
Bob Monroe, Carnegie Mellon
University, Tepper School of Business
Billions and Billions Sourced --
Lessons Learned Building Electronic Markets
(abstract),
(slides)
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12:00 noon |
Lunch |
1:30 pm |
Liad Blumrosen, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem
On the Computational Power of Ascending
Auctions (abstract) |
2:00 pm |
Sergei Izmalkov, MIT
Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient
Auction |
2:30 pm |
Weizhao Wang, Illinois Institute
of Technology
Towards Truthful Mechanism for Demand
Games (abstract) |
3:00 pm |
Discussion |
3:30 pm |
Break |
4:00 pm |
Anshul Kothari, University
of California, Santa Barbara Clearing
Algorithm for Multi-Item Procurement Auctions (abstract) |
4:30 pm |
Ryan Porter, Stanford University
Simple Search Methods for Finding a Nash
Equilibrium (abstract) |
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Friday,
October 29th |
9:00 am |
Continental Breakfast |
9:30 am |
Rakesh Vohra, Kellogg School
of Management, Northwestern University
Characterizing Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
with Multi-dimensional Types (abstract)
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10:00 am |
Yishay Mansour, Tel Aviv
University
Competitive Algorithms for VWAP and
Limit Order Trading (abstract)
|
10:30 am |
Discussion |
11:00 am |
Break |
11:30 am |
Tal Heppenstall, Founder
of PriMuni LLC |
12:00 noon |
Lunch |
1:30 pm |
Sham Kakade, University of
Pennsylvania Trading in Markovian
Price Models (abstract) |
2:00 pm |
Jean-Francois Richard, University
of Pittsburgh Computation of Nash
Equilibrium Bid Functions for Asymmetric Private Values First
Price Auctions (abstract) |
2:30 pm |
Discussion |
3:00 pm |
Break |
3:30 pm |
Kamal Jain, Georgia Institute
of Technology
A polynomial time exact algorithm to compute a market equilibrium
(abstract) |
4:00 pm |
Ronald Goettler, Carnegie
Mellon University Information
Acquisition in a Limit Order Market (abstract)
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This workshop is sponsored by National Science Foundation (NSF)
grant nos. CCR-0122581 and CCR-0121678.
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