November 7-8, 2003
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Recently,
with the advent of the Internet as one of the most important arenas
for resource sharing between parties with diverse and selfish
interests, many new and traditional dynamic pricing mechanisms
have been developed, studied, and deployed. With this, computer
scientists have joined economists in studying economic performance
issues in auctions and related problems.
This workshop will bring together researchers from economics
and computer science, and developers of auctions in the private
sector in an effort to identify, discuss, and better understand
the important research directions in auction theory and practice.
The focus of this meeting will be on economics goals--e.g., revenue/profit
maximization and efficiency--of designed mechanisms. There are
three major goals of this meeting. The first is to facilitate
the dissemination of recent results and techniques between the
fields of economics and computer science. The second is to see
how these developments are aiding practitioners and whether we
are answering questions relevant to practice. The third goal is
to identify key open questions for research in the area of auctions
and dynamic pricing mechanisms.
The workshop will be a combination of survey talks, new results,
and informal discussion. There will be no published proceedings,
but we plan to have a web page for the workshop with slides, pointers
to relevant papers, and so forth.
Organizing committee:
Jason
Hartline, Carnegie
Mellon University
Uday
Rajan, Carnegie Mellon
University
R. Ravi,
Carnegie Mellon University
Advance Registration Is Required by Friday,
October 31, 2003
Anyone planning to attend who has not yet registered (including
CMU faculty and students) should contact
Susan Hrishenko to register.
Agenda
New Location: All sessions will
be held in Newell Simon Hall 3305 unless
otherwise noted.
Walking
Direction from the Holiday Inn to Newell Simon Hall 3305
|
Friday, November 7 |
8:30 am |
Continental Breakfast |
9:00 am |
Keynote Speech: OR ∩ CS ∩ ET = ?
pdf
Rakesh
V. Vohra, Kellogg
School of Management, Northwestern
University |
10:00 am |
Break |
10:30 am |
Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
Jeroen
Swinkels, Olin
School of Business, Washington
University in St. Louis |
11:15 am |
Strategic Information Acquisition and Auctions
ppt
Kate
Larson, Computer
Science Department, Carnegie
Mellon University |
12:00
noon |
Lunch |
1:30 pm |
Keynote Speech: The Price of Truth
Anna
Karlin, Department
of Computer Science and Engineering, University
of Washington |
2:30 pm |
The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Bounds
for Regret in Online Posted-Price Auctions abstract,
ppt
Robert
Kleinberg, Department
of Mathematics, MIT |
3:15 pm |
Break |
3:45 pm |
Pricing and Revenue Optimization in Electronic
Commerce
Vijay Kumar, Amazon.com |
4:30 pm
- 6:00 pm |
Open Problem Session |
7:00 pm |
Dinner Party |
|
|
|
Saturday, November
8 |
8:30 am |
Continental Breakfast |
9:00 am |
Keynote Speech: Asymmetries and Efficiency
in Auctions
Vijay
Krishna, Department
of Economics, Penn
State University |
10:00 am |
Clock Auctions, Proxy Auctions, and Possible Hybrids
Lawrence Ausubel,
Department
of Economics, University
of Maryland |
10:45 am |
Break |
11:15 am |
On the Relationship Between Truthfulness
and Truthfulness in Expectation
Aranyak
Mehta, College
of Computing,
Georgia Institute of Technology |
12:00 noon
– 1:00 pm |
Discussion and Wrap-Up |
Poster